Synopsis
Activation Period |
14 Days |
Training Period |
30 Days |
Test Period |
N/A (single event) |
Deduplication Period |
1 Day |
Required Data |
|
Detection Modules |
|
Detector Tags |
Active Directory Federation Services Analytics |
ATT&CK Tactic |
|
ATT&CK Technique |
|
Severity |
Low |
Description
Detected an unauthorized configuration sync request to the ADFS Policy Store from a non-ADFS server, step for forging SAML tokens in a Golden SAML attack.
Attacker's Goals
The attack goal is to forge a valid SAML token to impersonate any user and gain persistent, unauthorized access to cloud resources, effectively bypassing MFA and standard security controls.
Investigative actions
- Correlate this network event with AD FS service account activity. The attacker must use the service account's credentials to authenticate this request.
- Check for a possible DCSync alerts.
- Check alerts that related to ADFS server.
- Check for other correlated alerts on on-premises systems that may be related to the Golden SAML attack.
- Look for signs that the user account is compromised (e.g. abnormal logins, unusual activity).
- Inspect the source machine for the presence of tools like AADInternals or custom SOAP-based scripts.